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1980/12/31

• CCHFIEENTIAL

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-SECTION 1 OF 4 NOFORN

AMEMB BANGKOK FOR CODEL SOARZ
SUBJ: IR (U)X
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT N5 18,-) 26 3;-) 7-53\$ 8,53)

1. (U) CTRY: CHINA (CH)V

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### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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3. (U) DATE OF INFO: IPONNO

4. (U) GRIG:

5. (U) REQ REFS:

6. (U) SOURCE

### 7. (CYNCFORN) SUMMARY:

MANY OF THE ANSWERS WERE RECURRING THEMES SUCH AS THE SUSTAINED BELIEF IN SOVIET WORLD-WIDE HEGEMONISTIC ASPIRATIONS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, POINTS OF EMPHASIS THAT WILL BE OF INTEREST TO THE ANALYST. AMONG THEM:
--THE CALL FOR A UNITED FRONT AGAINST THE USSR, INCLUDING THE US.

-- REJECTION OF A US-SINO ALLIANCE AGAINST RUSSIA.

-- REJECTION OF TAIWAN AS A MILITARY THREAT TO THE MAINLAND.

-- CONTINUED RELIANCE ON PEOPLE'S WAR AS THE SOLE ALTERNATIVE

IN A MILITARY WITH INACEQUATE EQUIPMENT.

--SUPPORT OF THE PLA LEADERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BEFORE JILITARY MODERNIZATION.

--IF TAIWAN TURNS TO THE USSR. CHINA WOULD USE FORCE FOR REUNIFICATION.

#### BA. <del>C/NOFORN) DETAILS:</del>

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION:

A. QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR ASSEMSSMENT OF THE MILITARY BALANCE BETJEEN EAST AND WEST IN CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC TERMS?

ANSSER: AS FCR THE MILITARY BALANCE I WANT TO TALK ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY. WE BELIEVE THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY SUPPORTS THEIR POLITICAL AMBITIONS FOR WORLD DOMINATION. THESE PAST YEARS THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH HAS GROWN AND THEY ARE PREPARED FOR A VONCENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR WAR. OF COURSE THE BEST WAY IS TO WIN WITHOUT FIGHTING. SO THEIR MILITARY FORCES HAVE DEVELOPED VERY QUICKLY. THE TOTAL FORCES FOR THE SOVIET UNION ARE 4.4 MILLION. ABOUT TWO TIMES THE US. IN TERMS OF CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS THEY EXEED THE US. SINCE THE US IS THE

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## DEPARTMENT OF CEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

SOVIET'S MAJOR ADVERSARY THEIR CEJECTIVE IS TO BUILD MILITARY FORCES TO SURPASS THEM. B. QUESTION: IF WAR COMES FETWEEN THE US AND USSR. OUR ALLIES WOULD ALSO BE INVOLVED. IF THE WAR SPREADS TO ASIA. POSSIBLY CHINA AND JAPAN MIGHT BE INVOLVED. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE SOVIET UNICK AND TE ALLIES ON ONE HAND VERSUS THE US AND ITS ALLIES ON THE CTHER? ANSWER: I VE JUST MENTIONED THAT THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE SSR SUPPORTS ITS POLITICAL AMBITION TO CONQUER THE WORLD. IT IS NOT JUST THE US THAT MUST DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION BUT WESTERN EUROPE. CHINA. JAPAN AND THIRD WORDL COUNTRIES AS WELL. THE STRATEGIC POINT REQUIRES US TO BE UNITED. IF WE ARE UNITED THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE WEAK AND WE WILL BE STRONG. C. GUESTION: WE HAVE ALLIANCES WITH KOREA, JAPAN WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHERS. ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT CHINA SHOULD BE A PART OF THE FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH WAS DEVELOPED IN PAST YEARS? ANSWER: IN MY OPINION. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD SIUTATION TODAY REQUIRES NEW UNITY. THE FORM MAY NOT BE LIFE THATOF WW II AND IT MAY NOT LINK NATIONS TOGETHER WITH TREATIES. IN REALITY I DON'T THINK THE US FAVORS THE IDEA OF CHINA AS AN ALLY. ALSO WE DON'T THNK THE EEST WAY OAT FOR CHINA IS TO BECOME AN ALLY OF THE US. IF CHINA AND THE US WERE LINKED BY AN ALLIED RELATIONSHIP THIS MIGHT PLACE BOTH IN A DIFFERENT SITUATION. IN MY OPINION WHEN THE WORLD SITUATION DEVEOPLS. WE NEED NOT COPY THE FORMS OF HISTORY. WHEN WAR HAPPENS. WE CAN HAVE CTHER ICEAS. D. GUESTION: WHAT DIFFICULTUIES WOULD A FORMAL RELATION-SHIP PRESENT TO THE US AND CHINAB

ACTION DIA(+)

INFO NIDS(+) SAGA(+) NMCC:(+) J5(+) IADB(+) RDJTF:LO(+)

SECDEF:(+) SECDEF(+) USDP(++) ASD:PA&E(+) NMIC(+)

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PAGE 04 OF 04 CONFIDENTIAL 310833Z DEC 80 SECT 01 OF 04

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 4 NOFORNANSWER: EECAUSE SOME NATION. ESPEICIALLY IN THE
THIRD WORLD. HOAVE UNFOVORABLE OPION BECAUSE OF
RECENT HOSTIRY. CHINA ALSO HAS THIS PROBLEM. ALSO.
SOME PRUBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED BY WORDS SO WE CAN DEAL
WITH THE DANGER ACCORDING TO THE CONDITION.
E. GUESTION: WHAT FORM SHOULD THIS UNITY TAKE IF AN
ALLIANCE IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO COPE WITH SOVIET HEGEMONY?
ANSWER: I THINK WE CAN DO AS WE ARE NOW. HAVING

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## DEPARTMENT OF CEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

CWN CONDITION. I CAN SAY THIS IS FEASIBLE NON. THE EXPRESSION THE CHINESE OFTEN USE IS A UNITED FRONT AGAINST MEGEMONY. IN THIS MANNER THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD STAND AGAINST HEGEMONISM. F. CUESTION: IT INTERESTED IN WHAT YOU WANT FROM THE US? GO YOU WANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO YOUR COUNTRY? CO YOU WANT THE US TO SEELL ARMS TO CHINA? ANSWER: THAT DEPENDS ON THE SITUATION HOW IT DEVFLOPS AND THE WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES. I MEAN THE US CAN TAKE ITS ACTION ACCORDING TO ITS OWN CONDITIONS. BUT AS FOR WEAPONS SALES THAT IS ANOTHER ISSUE. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE US SELLS WEAPONS TO CHINA WE ARE GPPOSED TO SOVIET HEGEMONISM. WE HAVE ALREAYS HELD THAT WE CAN USE WHATEVER MEANS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ENDS. I HAVE BEEN A SCLIDIER FOR OVER FORTY YEARS. OUR EXPERIENCE INWAR IS THAT WE ALWAYS HAD INFERIOR WEAPONS. WE HOPE TO NARROW THE GAP EETWEEN OURS AND THE ENEMIES. IF NOT. THAT'S CK.

STRATEGIC COORDINATION WHILE COING ACCORDING TO OUR

G. QUESTION: SOME SAY SINCE YOUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE IS LIMITED, COSTS PROGHIEITS PURCHASES IN GREAT QUANTITY EVEN IF THE US WERE FREPARED TO SELL ARMS. ANSWER: THERE ARE TWO GUESTIONS HERE. IS THE US WILLING TO SEEL. AND SECOND CAN CHINA AFFORD TO BUY? I KNOW SOME PEOPLE IN THE US ARE ACTIVE (ON THE SUBJECT) OF SEELING WEAPONS TO CHINA. THOSE WHO TAKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE ARE FOR THE SALE. THOSE WHO ARE NEGATIVE ARE AGAINST. THE US MUST FIRST SOLVE THIS CONFLICT. I WANT TO ADD THAT EVEN IF THE US CAN SELL US WEAPONS OR TECHNOLOGY. WE WILL NOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE US. CHINA'S POPULATION IS LARGE AND NUMBER OF TROOPS GREAT. WE MUST RELY ON OUR OWN EFFORTS. BUT IF THE US CAN TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA TO REFORM OUR EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD BE GOOD FOR US. SOME PEOPLE THINK WE RELY ON US HELP-THAT IS A WRONG IDEA.

H. GLESTION: DO YOU HAVE A DRAFT?
ANSWER: YES. WE HAVE A COMPULSARY SYSTEM. HOWEVER
SOME ARE VOLUNTARY.

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DEPARTMENT OF CEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

I. GUESTION: HOW LONG IS THE TOUR OF SERVICE? ANSWER: FROM THREE TO FIVE YEARS DEPENDING ON THE SERVICE. WE WARTED TOS SHORTEN THE TIME BUT CHANGED OUR MINES. SOME SOLDIERS IN TECHNICAL FIELDSS SECOME VOLUNTEERS. J. GUESTION: WHAT PERCENTAGE OF YOUR SOLDIERS ARE DRAFTED AND WHAT PERCENTAGE STAY IN FOR A CAREER? ANSWER: THE NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS IS NOT GREAT. THIS CEPENCS ON THE WORLD SITUATION. WE CO NOT SET A PERCENTAGE FOR VOLUNTEERS. FOR INSANCE IN A REGIMENT WHERE TECHNICIANS ARE NEEDED. WE MAY ASK CONSCRIPTS TO REMAIN VOLUNTARILY. OFFICERS ARE CAREER SOLDIERS AND MAY STAY LONGER. I.E. FOR LIFE. K. GUESTION: DO MEN IN SERVICE DO PUBELIC WORKS? ANSWER: FOR A PERIOD SCLDIERS IN THE ARMY WERE ACTIVE IN PRODUCTION WORK. THE HAS CHANGED AND MILITARY TRAINING IS EMPHASIZED. OUR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION WORKERS ARE ENGAGED IN MILITARY PROJECTS. THERE IS ONE GROUP. THE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. THIS SFRVICE IS NOT SUBORCINATE TO THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. BUT UNDER THE STATE COUNCIL. L. GUESTION: ONCE A SOLDIER LEAVES THE ACTIVE FORCES DOES HE CO INTO THE RESERVES? ANSWER: WE HAVE A MILITIA. ALL YOUTH CAN BE MILITIA BUT IN WAR THEY CAN BE SOLDIERS. M. GUESTION: YOU SAID YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. WHAT KIND? ANSWER: THIS CEPENDS ON THE WILLINGNEESS OF BOTH SIDES. THIS YEAR YOUR DEFENSE MISSIONS TO CHINA AND THOSE WHO WENT TO THE US DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT ALOT. IF POSSIBLE THEE DISCUSSIONS CAN CONTINUE. IF NOT. YOU CAN HAVE YOUR OWN WAY BUT WE HOPE THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN DEVELOP. N. QUESTION: WHAT LESSONS DID THE CHINESE MILITARY LEARN IN THE SINO-SRV WAR? ANSWER: MOST IMPORTANT WAS THAT TO GIVE THE SRV A FIGHT WAS BETTER THAN NOT TO FIGHT. WE VIEW THIS FROM AN OVERALL STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE. IN MAY OPINION IF CHINA HAD NOT FOUGHT. TODAY'S SITUATION IN SOUTHEGST ASIA WOULD BE WORSE. VIETNAM NOW HAS 1.2 MILLION

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TROOPS. SIXTY PERCENT ARE PINNED DOWN NORTH OF HANCI. IF WE HAD NOT DONE THIS (PROSECUTED THE WAR) THE VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT HAVE DONE THIS. ALSO THE THREAT T THAILAND WOULD HAVE PEEN GREATER. IN TERMS OF LESSONS IN TACTICS CRAWN FROM THE BORDER WAR. THIS SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED TODAY. IF AMERICAN MILITARY OFFICERS COME TO CHINA AND WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE BETAILED DIDCUSSIONS ON TACTICS.

ACTION DIA(+)

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 3 OF 4 NOFORM

AMEMB BANGKOK FOR CODEL SOARZ
SUBJ: IR (U)
C. GUESTION: IF VIETNAM INVADES THAILAND WOULD
CHINA GIVE THEM A SECOND LESSON?
ANSWER: WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED AND HAVE SAID SO.
WE HAVE TOLD THAILAND THAT IF VIETNAM INVADES WE WILL

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DEPARTMENT OF CEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

STAND BY THEIR SIDE. AS FOR WAHT CONCRETE ACTIONS WE WOULD TAKE THAT DEPENDS ON THE SITUATION. P. GUESTION: TO YOU CONSIDER TAIWAN A THREAT TO THE MAINLAND? ANSWER: I HAVE HEARD YOU HAD A LONG DISCUSSION (ON THIS SUBJECT) WITH ((ZHANG)) WENJIN. I AM A SOLDIER; I AM AFRAID I WOULD BECOME EMCTIONAL. NONETHELESS SINCE WE ARE FRIENDS WE SHOULD COORDINATE OUR STRATEGY. WE HOPE THE US WILL BE CAUTIOUS CONCERNING TAIWAN. IF YOU GO TOO FAR IT WILL HARM THE FEELING OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND IN TURN HARM OUR RELATIONS. I HAD AN EHTICNAL DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE WITH MR. ALLEN. PLEASE GIVE HIM MY REGARDS. GUESTION: DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERN ABOUT TAIWAN ATTACKING THE MAINLAND? ANSWER: TAIWAN IS INCAPABLE. BUT UP TO NOW THE US IS SELLING WEAPONS AND THIS WILL DESTROY THE CURRENT SITUATION. WE HOPE THAT UNIFICATION CAN BE FULFILLED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. HOWEVER, IF YOU ENCOURAGE TAIWAN AGAINST THE MAINLAND YOU GO BEYOND THE FOLICY FRAME-WORK OF THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS. THIS WOULD DESTROY THE OVERALL STRAGETIC RELATIONSHIP. WE WILL NEVER SELL OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. EVEN TO MAKE FRIENDS. THIS QUESTION IS NOT NEGOTIABLE. AS A CHINESE SOLDIER I WOULD BE TRIED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE IF I DIDN'T OPPOSE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IF TAIWAN TURNED TO THE USSR OR REFUSED FOREVER TO RETURN TO THE EMBRACE OF THE MOTHERLAND. FINALLY WE MUST RESORT TO FORCE. SOME SAY THE CHINESE TROOPS AND NAVY ARE TOO WEAK. BUT AS A CHINESE SOLDIER IF WE ARE COMPELLED IN THE FUTURE, WE WILL THINK A WAY OUT. AND USE VERY MEANS POSSIBLE. R. GEUSTION: IN WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION. DO YOU BELIEVE YOUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD DETER SOVIET USE OF THE SAME? ANSER: GUR NECLEAR FORCES ARE VERY SMALL. EVEN IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKS WE WILL NOT RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE A SMALL SCALE AFFORDABLE NUCLEAR

FORCE. WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WE CAN RESIST AGAINST

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

THEM SUT PERHAPS THERE WILL BE GREAT CASUALTIES OVER A LONG TIME. I CON\*T BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION CAN WIPE US BUT.

S. GUESTIGM: DO YOU BELIEVE THE USSR WOULD USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

ANSWER: THIS IS HARD TO PREDICT. BUT IF THEY USE THEM THE CONFLICT WOULD EXPAND BEYOND THE TWO SIDES.

T. GUESTIGM: DO YOU ASSUME THAT YOUR FORCES COUNTERING THE USSR WOULD BE ORGANIZED FORCES.

PEOPLE'S WAR OR CUERILLAS?

ANSWER: OUR MILITARY IDEOLOGY IS STILL PEOPLE S WAR. OUR WEAPONS ARE UNDERDEVELOPED. SO SHE MUST USE PEOPLE'S WAR. EVEN IF OUR WEAPONS ARE ADVANCED WE WOULD STILL USE PEOPLE S WAR. U. QUESTION: WHAT IS PEOPLE'S AR? ANSWER: THERE ARE THREE SECTIONS OF OUR MILITARY FORCES: THE FIELD ARMIES. LOCAL FORCES AND THE MILITIA. THE FIELD ARMIES ARE MOBILE FORCES WHILE LOCAL FORCES AND MILITIA FIGHT IN THEIR OWN REGIONS. IF A MAJOR OPERATION BY THE ENEMY IS IN A REGION, THE FIELD ARMY WILL BE THERE. LOCAL FORCES WILL COORDINATE WITH THE FILED ARMY. IF IT IS NOT A MAJOR ENEMY FORCE. LOCAL FORCES AND THE MILITIA WILL FIGHT THE BATTLE. GUESTION: HOW MAY TROOPS ARE IN THE FIELD ARMY AND MILITIA? ANSER: THE NUMBER OF FIELD UNITS IS KNOWN TO YOU. I \* VE READ IT . NUMBER OF LOCAL UNITS ARE DIFFERENT. THE MILITIA ARE NUMBEROUS. I'M NOT CLEAR HOW MANY. PERHPAS ONE HUNDRED MILLION. GUESTION: ARE THE MILITIA THOSE WITH PRIOR MILITARY SERVICE? ANSWER: SOME ARE DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS. THE MILITIA MEN ARE ORGNIZED INTO DIVISONS AND REGIMENTS. X. GUESTION: HOW HUCH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON VIVIL CEFENSE IN YOUR PLANNING? OUR CIVIL DEFENSE IS TWO SIDED. FCSITIVE AND ANSWER:

PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE WE HAVE ANTI AIR RAID TROOPS (AAA) AND ON THE DEFENSE

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### DEPARTMENT OF CEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

SIDE .E DIG TUNNELS. Y. GUESTION: CO YOU HAVE SHELTERS IN ALL MAJOR CITIES? ANSWER: YES. SOME ARE GOOD. SOME NOT SO GOOD. SEIJING'S ARE JUST SO-SO. PERHPAS THE TUNNELS YOU SAW WERE DUG BY THE MASSES. THOSE DONE BY SOLDIERS ARE BETTER. WE ARE INFERIOR IN WEAPONS SO WE MUST HAVE A SHELTER PROGFAM. THAT PROGRAM IS NEARLY ENDED BUT WE WILL IMPROVE THE OLDER ONES. Z. GUESTION: WHAT ARE THE MAJOR WEAKNESSES IN THE PLA? ANSWER: AAA, ANTI TANK, ANTI SUBMARINE. AA. GEUSTION: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE DECIISION TO REDUCE THE (MILITARY) BUDGET? BT

ACTION DIA(+) INFO NIDS(+) SAGA(+) NMCC:(+) J5(+) IADB(+) RDJTF:LO(+) SECDEF: (+) SECDEF(+) USDP(++) ASD:PARE(+) NMIC(+) RTS-28(+) SWS(+) DC-4(+) AT(+) AIS(+) DIO(+) DE(+) UB-1G(+) DB-2B(+) DB-2C(+) DB-4A(+) DT-1(+) DIA FILE(\*) +CSA WASHINGTON DC +CNO WASHINGTON DC +CSAF WASHINGTON DC +CIA WASHINGTON DC +SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC +CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

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GONFIDENTIAL SECTION 4 OF 4 NOFORNANSWER: PERHAPS CHINA'S MILITARY ARE DIFFERENT FROM
THOSE OF THE US. IN THE US THERE ARE DISPUTES
BETWEEN US CIVILIANS AND MILITARY MEN. HERE IT IS
EASY FOR THE CHINESE SOLDIER TO UNDERSTAND THAT
WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT OF OUR INDUSTRY. AGRICULTURE AND
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY THERE CAN BE NO DEVELOPMENTS
IN NATIONAL DEFENSE. OF COURSE WE WOULD BE HAPPY


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### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

TO SEE A GUICK DEVELOPMENT. BUT IF THERE IS NO DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE. INCUSTRY AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. THE TALKS OF NATICAL DEFENSE IS FUTILE. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WOULD NOT LAST LONG. IF THE GOVERNMENT PUT ALL ITS HONEY IN NATIONAL DEFENSE IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATION. SO OUR MILITARY PLANNING MUST EE BASED ON DEPENDENCE ON EXISTING FORCES. BB. QUESTION: WHAT DOES SUPPORTING MILITARY MODERNIZATIONMEAN?

ANSWER: WE HOPE TO RAISE OUR MILITARY LEVEL BY MAKING FULL USE OF EXISTING WEAPONS. TIS IS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH WE VIEW MILITARY DEVELOPMENT.

8B. (C/NOFORH) ORIG COMMENTS:



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# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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